Brazil’s bilateral machinery with South Africa, only weeks old and running, now faces a possible shutdown. On 25 October, Brazilians return to the polls to decide whether President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stays in office, or whether the country turns right again under Flávio Bolsonaro, son of imprisoned former president Jair Bolsonaro. Recent opinion polls show a statistical tie, and the outcome will reach far beyond Brazil’s borders.
The operational record is recent and concrete. Just two months ago, the two governments met in Pretoria for the eighth session of the Brazil-South Africa Joint Commission, reaffirming commitments to strengthen bilateral cooperation and advance a common agenda for the Global South. International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola stressed the partnership’s importance at a time when multilateralism faces critical challenges. That programme of work, built across Africa’s and Latin America’s largest industrial economies, is what hangs in the balance.
Brazil under Lula has functioned as a reliable operator in the multilateral system. Alongside South Africa, it has long pushed for a fairer international order and demanded reforms to institutions dominated by Western powers, such as the UN Security Council. Cooperation through BRICS, the G20 and other platforms has been instrumental in promoting greater independence for developing countries. These commitments have not always translated into consistent foreign policy positions, but the delivery record under Lula has made Brazil an important working partner for South Africa.
A Bolsonaro victory would likely dismantle much of that operating framework. During his father’s administration, Brazil turned away from its traditional commitment to South-South cooperation, favouring close ideological ties with Donald Trump and the US. Flávio Bolsonaro has embraced much of his father’s political agenda, and his victory would likely pull Brazil closer to Washington, weakening its position as an independent voice in global affairs.
That matters most now because the Trump administration has shown restraint in no arena, deploying economic, diplomatic and, at times, military means to force other countries into line. Both Brazil and South Africa have been targets of such pressure, which makes their cooperation more important, not less. If Brazil moves closer to Washington, South Africa could find itself increasingly isolated and more vulnerable to American pressure.
The implications run across Africa as well. Lula has prioritised stronger relations with African countries, recognising Brazil’s historical and cultural connections to the continent and promoting cooperation across the South Atlantic. Under Jair Bolsonaro, Africa largely disappeared from Brazil’s foreign policy priorities. A return to that approach would weaken, if not implode, an important bridge between Africa and Latin America.
Meanwhile, there is also a specific programme at risk: Brazil’s position in South Africa’s case against Israel. Under Lula, Brazil has been an outspoken critic of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and in September 2025 it formally joined South Africa’s genocide case at the International Court of Justice. The Bolsonaro family, by contrast, has close ties to conservative evangelical movements that treat support for Israel as both a religious duty and a political priority. During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, Brazil became one of Israel’s closest allies in Latin America. Flávio has promised to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly backed his candidacy, congratulating him personally on his first-round electoral performance. For Netanyahu, a Bolsonaro win would be a major diplomatic gain while Israel faces growing international condemnation. For South Africa and the Palestinian people, it would mean losing an influential ally in the struggle for justice and accountability.
Deeper still is the question of whether the shared delivery model of both countries can survive. Brazil and South Africa emerged from deeply unequal and authoritarian systems with constitutions that promised more than political rights: equality, dignity and human rights, and attention to the injustices of the past. Those principles are under attack today, including within BRICS itself. The bloc’s expansion has brought in countries with diverging political systems and troubling records on democratic freedoms, women’s rights and the rights of LGBTI people, raising the question of whether BRICS can champion a fairer world while staying largely silent about repression among its own members. Brazil and South Africa have been among the countries best positioned to push a more progressive vision of South-driven transformation. A Bolsonaro victory would make that considerably harder, leaving South Africa further isolated. The risk is that BRICS becomes a club of resource-rich states united by commercial interests and opposition to the West, without any meaningful commitment to transforming the global order, an outcome that would benefit only ruling classes and economic elites in the North and South alike, and one that Trump and Netanyahu would welcome.
For South Africa, then, the Brazilian election is about the future of a working bilateral partnership and of a Global South project still under construction. On 25 October, Brazilians decide their country’s political future. Whether that partnership keeps running, or shuts down, is the question South Africans have good reason to watch.