SA's state-led growth model fails to deliver jobs

SA's state-led growth model fails to deliver jobs

Thirty years of state-centred policy leaves jobs and services undelivered

South Africa’s economic machinery has not delivered. Three decades after the ANC took office with an outright majority, the country has failed to make meaningful inroads into unemployment, poverty and inequality, and the party’s own development blueprint is a central reason why. That model, built on the assumption that the state is the primary engine of job creation, welfare provision and growth, has now been tested across six decades of African governance. Its operational record is poor wherever it has been implemented.

The workings of the ANC’s African liberation-movement economic model are worth unpacking, because they explain the gap between what was promised and what has actually been built. Under this approach, mass employment is expected to come from the state and big factories, powered by fossil fuels. That formula dates to the post-Second World War era. It persists despite rapid technological change and the urgent search among peer nations for alternatives to fossil fuels. In practice, the ANC has been slow to develop clean energy alternatives and has not invested in new technologies, such as microchips and artificial intelligence, the way South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam have.

Growth itself, the strategy pursued by China, Japan and Singapore, is frequently dismissed by party leaders as a World Bank neoliberal concept. Foreign investment is viewed with suspicion, on the fear that foreign capital will dominate local markets. Yet it is vast inflows of overseas capital, carrying new technology, capital and skills, that have fuelled fast-growing emerging economies such as China, Vietnam and India. Small and medium enterprises receive similarly sceptical treatment, rarely regarded as a serious route to mass employment and instead framed as a Western market-driven orthodoxy. Across developed and emerging markets since the Second World War, SMEs have created the most jobs and reduced poverty and inequality on a mass scale, which makes the ANC government’s neglect of small business a critical delivery failure.

Implementation choices reveal how the model works on the ground. The ANC’s black economic empowerment strategy has prioritised creating big black industrialists to rival the Oppenheimers and the Ruperts, while SME promotion, though stated as an official BEE objective, remains a passing concern for many leaders. SMEs are often seen as low-level survivalist micro-enterprises, a category that during apartheid came to be associated with blacks only. Like Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF, the ANC has pursued an indigenisation strategy that compels private and foreign firms to hand over shares to locals, in most cases leading party politicians, while granting companies linked to those leaders preferential procurement for state contracts, resource rights and trading licences.

The distribution of benefits under this framework is equally telling. Elites receive state and private-sector empowerment, indigenisation, resource deals and licences, plus deployments to legislatures, councils, the public service and state-owned enterprises. The poor receive social grants and food, fuel and agricultural subsidies. The ANC’s push for a basic income grant is, in effect, its version of BEE for poor supporters. South Africa’s mineral wealth, meanwhile, offers bountiful resources, with mines either nationalised or required to cede shares to ANC-connected politicians under BEE, much as in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique. That mineral bounty often leads liberation-movement governments to neglect non-mineral sectors such as technology and education.

Land reform, another key pillar, has in comparable settings seen land nationalised, as in Tanzania, Mozambique and Algeria, or seized and handed to people connected to liberation movements, as in Zimbabwe, often with little regard for food security or agricultural industrialisation, producing food shortages, inflation and starvation. Property rights are treated as secondary, even though they underpin any modern economy: without ownership protections, countries fail to attract investment, savings or capital. Expropriation and nationalisation caused massive capital outflows, record inflation and widespread business closures, collapsing the economies of Zimbabwe, Algeria and Tanzania.

The financing side shows the same disconnect from operational reality. Government leaders believe the state can tax its way out of crisis, wrongly assuming the wealthy are mostly white and treating higher taxes as reparations for apartheid. In March 2024, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana told the SABC that the government was not running out of money and could never run out, because it could always tax its citizens.

The verdict on delivery is blunt. The model has failed in every African country run by a liberation movement in the past 60 years, and it has failed in South Africa over the ANC’s 30 years of outright majority. Its reach endures through the ANC-SACP-Cosatu Tripartite Alliance, which has dominated governance since apartheid’s end, and through spin-off movements such as the EFF and the MK party that have replicated the ideology in more extreme forms. Even as the ANC declines electorally, many citizens who reject its corruption and incompetence still endorse its underlying economic policy, some arguing it was ideologically corrupted by big business, white monopoly capital and institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. With low levels of economic literacy reinforcing the model as dominant doctrine among the public, civil servants and civil society, the result has been degraded debate and a binding constraint on growth, job creation and poverty alleviation. Whether the ANC’s electoral decline will finally force a rethink of the model itself remains the open question.

Q&A

How has the ANC approached clean energy and new technologies?

The ANC has been slow to develop clean energy alternatives and has not invested in new technologies, such as microchips and artificial intelligence, the way South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam have.

How does the ANC treat foreign investment and SMEs?

Party leaders view them with suspicion, fearing foreign capital will dominate local markets, even though vast inflows of overseas capital carrying technology, capital and skills have fuelled fast-growing economies such as China, Vietnam and India.

What does the article say about mineral wealth and BEE?

Mineral wealth leads liberation-movement governments to neglect non-mineral sectors such as technology and education, while mines are either nationalised or required to cede shares to ANC-connected politicians under BEE, as in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique.

What outcomes has land reform produced in comparable settings?

Land has been nationalised or seized and handed to people connected to liberation movements, often with little regard for food security or agricultural industrialisation, producing food shortages, inflation and starvation in Zimbabwe, Algeria and Tanzania.