African states have a narrow but real opportunity to shape how the world’s largest commons are governed. The outcome will matter for citizens across the continent who depend on the ocean for food, livelihoods and climate resilience. That is the central argument of a new analysis published on 29 October 2026 by David Willima, a researcher in climate risk and human security at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, writing in ISS Today.
The stakes rest on a treaty most people have never heard of. The Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, known as the BBNJ Agreement, sets rules for the high seas and the seabed beyond any country’s jurisdiction. That space covers nearly two-thirds of the world’s ocean. The agreement entered into force on 17 January after reaching the 60-ratification threshold, and its parties will gather in New York from 11 to 22 January 2027 for the first Conference of the Parties, or COP1, the body that will make its decisions.
On paper, the agenda sounds bureaucratic: establishing a secretariat, defining its relationship with the UN, setting terms of reference for subsidiary bodies, activating funds, and agreeing on working methods. But history, the analysis warns, shows that these early procedural choices often lock in lasting effects, and not always in the public’s favour. The precedent cited is the World Trade Organization’s informal Green Room practice, in which a few major economies negotiate key texts and present them to other members. In 1999, African ministers protested that the process lacked transparency and refused to join the consensus, contributing to the collapse of the Seattle ministerial talks.
Whether Africa can shape the rules begins with who holds a vote. The continent has 22 members of the treaty, giving it 21% of the agreement’s 104 state parties. Because only parties can make decisions at the COP and nominate experts to its subsidiary bodies, timing matters. The agreement takes effect 30 days after a new party deposits its instrument, so countries must deposit by 12 December to arrive at COP1 as full parties. Otherwise, 32 African states will watch critical rules on finance, data and reporting being written without them.
A seat, however, does not guarantee influence. If consensus fails on key questions such as where the secretariat will be hosted, the decision goes to a two-thirds secret ballot. Rules on sharing benefits from marine genetic resources, which are studied for medicine and other uses, require a three-quarters majority. If Africa made up at least a quarter of member states it could block a 75% vote on its own; with a third, a two-thirds vote. The analysis stresses that consensus on common positions will be essential, because not all member states can participate actively across parallel tracks, meaning smaller delegations may need to unite to ensure representation in the rooms where deals are made.
Meanwhile, four decisions at COP1 will test whether African seats can be converted into influence. The first is the location of the secretariat, where China, Chile and Belgium have bid to host, and where Africa, as the largest UN voting bloc, will be crucial. African capitals have been courted to back these bids, and the analysis suggests they should assess how prospective hosts will protect the secretariat’s independence, its data, and funds for developing states. Because the vote will be by secret ballot, promises made to single capitals will be harder to deliver, and African parties can work to ensure their votes align with those priorities.
The second concerns the Scientific and Technical Body, which reviews proposals for area-based management tools, comments on environmental impact assessments, and sets the standards those assessments must meet. The BBNJ Preparatory Commission, at its third session known as PrepCom3, did not agree on whether members of this and other subsidiary bodies could be elected at COP1. Without early nominations and elections, the body’s formation could be delayed until COP2. The recommendation is for African states to identify strong candidates early and draw on their scientific institutions and regional networks. Organisations such as the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association can help identify and connect relevant expertise and build the capacity of prospective experts and delegations, so that African representatives are backed by strong regional knowledge rather than depending on externally generated science.
Third is the agreement’s financial architecture. The Special Fund will draw on new financial sources separate from the Global Environment Facility, which already services five other agreements, and will finance training and technology transfer to help developing states implement the treaty. During PrepCom3, delegates recommended a 35-member committee to draft the fund’s founding rules for adoption at COP2. The fund is unlikely to function for at least two years, and because the committee will shape who can draw on it, Africa needs strong members on it.
The fourth decision involves marine genetic resources, which are stored online. Africa negotiated strongly for these resources to be recognised as the common heritage of humankind, to be shared equitably, but putting that principle into practice is the challenge. The Convention on Biological Diversity’s voluntary Cali Fund, which collects payments from companies using such data, has received only US$6 000 from two companies since February 2025. Related to this, the BBNJ Agreement’s Clearing-House Mechanism, which enables access to and dissemination of information on all BBNJ activities, including notifications about the collection and use of marine genetic resources and their digital sequence information, must be established soon. Delegates are still choosing between a central system and one with regional nodes, and the analysis argues African states should select an equitable and inclusive model that draws on the region’s scientific knowledge.
None of this will happen without preparation. Although considerable work is underway to align African positions, forging and sustaining a unified front remains notoriously difficult amid constrained resources, competing national priorities, and differing coastal, island and landlocked realities. Two elements are flagged as critical. Regional seas conventions have a key role, since the BBNJ Agreement says it must be applied in a way that promotes coordination and does not undermine regional bodies. Africa has four, covering the Atlantic, the Western Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Nairobi Convention, covering the Western Indian Ocean, is working towards a coordinated approach to implementation, and the other three could do the same. Second, with limited resources and capacity, Africa cannot afford to rebuild its expertise every few years; it needs steady long-term capacity building so knowledge stays in place when diplomats rotate or experts move on.
COP1, the analysis concludes, will decide far more than procedure. The January meeting will determine who steers the agreement’s implementation mechanisms, raising environmental, economic and security questions for the continent. Africa helped shape the BBNJ Agreement; it must now help decide how it is implemented, or risk having its interests sidelined. Its influence will depend on converting presence into long-term negotiating power, institutional ownership and effective implementation. Whether the continent’s citizens, from fishing communities to coastal towns facing a changing climate, see their stake reflected in the high seas rules may be decided in New York this January.